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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Kenneth Brown appeals the district court's denial of his 
motion to suppress evidence discovered during a stop and 
frisk conducted by York City, Pennsylvania police officers. 
Brown claims that the stop and subsequent "pat-down" 
were not based on facts sufficient to support a warrantless 
stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review the 
factual findings of the district court for clear error. See 
United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700, 116 
S. Ct. 1657, 1662-63 (1996)). We review the district court's 
conclusion that there was reason to conduct the Terry stop 




At approximately 1:30 a.m. on January 24, 1996, York 
City police officers received a radio call of "shots fired" in 
the 700 block of West King Street--an area known as a 
"very high crime area." Shortly thereafter, a second radio 
transmission reported that two victims of the shooting had 
been taken away by a private vehicle. Officer Michael 
Koltunovich, a uniformed police officer in a marked police 
vehicle, immediately responded. As he approached the area, 
he saw five African American men walking in the vicinity of 
the reported crime scene along West Princess Street. Except 
for these five men, the streets were deserted. Koltunovich 
stopped his vehicle and asked the men to "hold up." Two 
men stopped, were frisked for weapons, questioned and 
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released. The other three men continued walking. 
Koltunovich radioed a description of the three men and 
stated that one (Brown) wore a black leather jacket and 
bright white knit cap. 
 
Uniformed Officer Todd Ross was also on patrol that 
night in a marked police vehicle. As Ross responded to the 
"shots fired" call, he heard Koltunovich radio that three 
potential suspects were walking east along West Princess 
Street. Within seconds after receiving the radio 
transmission, Ross saw Brown on West Princess Street 
near the crime scene wearing a black leather jacket and 
bright white knit cap. When Ross stopped his vehicle, 
Brown turned and ran into an alley. Ross radioed this 
information. Koltunovich then radioed that he saw Brown 
enter Gus's Bar. Ross entered the bar and saw a white knit 
cap next to a man wearing a black leather jacket. The man 
stated that the cap was his and that he had a weapon. 
Koltunovich entered the bar and identified Brown as the 
person who had walked away from him earlier that night. 
The police officers frisked Brown and found an unloaded, 
sawed-off .22 caliber rifle. Brown was arrested and taken to 
the police station where they conducted a thorough search 
and found drugs, money and ammunition. A grand jury 
indicted Brown for one count of possession of afirearm by 
a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1) and 
one count of possession of an unregistered sawed-off rifle in 
violation of 26 U.S.C. S 5861(d). Brown was not charged 
with the shootings. 
 
Brown moved to suppress: (1) his statement admitting 
possession of the firearm; (2) the firearm; (3) the 
ammunition; and (4) the drugs. Brown claims that the 
officers lacked the reasonable suspicion required to conduct 
a warrantless stop and frisk. Brown argues that the only 
basis for the stop and frisk was that he fled from police and 
that this, without more, is insufficient to justify a Terry 
stop. The district court found that reasonable suspicion 
supported the Terry stop and denied the motion to 




In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 
(1968), the Supreme Court held that a police officer may 
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conduct a warrantless stop and frisk if specific and 
articulable facts, together with all rational inferences, 
suggest that the suspect was involved in criminal activity. 
This investigatory stop is short of an arrest and can be 
justified by "less than the probable cause necessary for an 
arrest." Roberson, 90 F.3d at 77. However, a mere "hunch" 
or "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion" cannot justify 
a stop and frisk under Terry. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 
S. Ct. at 1883. Deference, however, is given to the officer's 
conclusions based on the officer's experience. See United 
States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 
695 (1981)). An officer cannot conduct a Terry stop simply 
because criminal activity is afoot. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 
88 S. Ct. at 1884. Instead, the officer must have a 
particularized and objective basis for believing that the 
particular person is suspected of criminal activity. See 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 
690, 695 (1981). 
 
Brown contends that his flight from police is insufficient 
to support a Terry stop and frisk. We disagree.* We have 
held that flight combined with other factors may support a 
warrantless stop and frisk. See United States ex rel. 
Richardson v. Rundle, 461 F.2d 860, 863-64 (3d Cir. 1972). 
These other factors, apropos to Brown's stop include: (1) 
the reputation of an area for criminal activity, see Rickus, 
737 F.2d at 365; (2) a suspect's flight upon seeing his 
companion questioned and frisked by officers, see United 
States v. Embry, 546 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1976); and (3) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Brown relies on LaFave, Search and Seizure, S 3.6(e) (3d Ed. 1997) 
(citing United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256, 265 (E.D. Pa. 1966)) 
(stating that "[t]he flight of a person from the presence of police is not 
standing alone sufficient to establish probable cause"), and United States 
v. Young, 598 F.2d 296, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Robinson, J., concurring) 
(commenting that "association with a supposed criminal does not 
necessarily blossom into probable cause, simply because of subsequent 
flight from oncoming police"), for the proposition that flight, alone, 
cannot justify a Terry stop and frisk. These authorities, however, discuss 
flight in the context of establishing probable cause for an arrest. 
Additionally, United States v. Duffy, 796 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (D. Minn. 
1992), which does hold that flight from police officers, without more, is 
insufficient to support a Terry pat-down, is not binding on us. 
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a suspect's attempts to elude police officers, see Rundle, 
461 F.2d at 864 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 
66, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1904 (1966)). 
 
In Rundle, we noted that 
 
       "deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach 
       of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens 
       rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the 
       part of the officer relating the suspect to evidence of 
       crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the 
       decision to make an arrest." 
 
461 F.2d at 864 (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 66, 88 S. Ct. 
at 1904). Rundle involved police officers on routine patrol in 
a high crime area who witnessed four youths running from 
a drug store around closing time. See id. at 862-64. The 
officers also knew that robberies generally occurred when 
stores opened or closed. See id. at 863. Therefore, based on 
their observances and experience, they concluded that "a 
crime was either being perpetrated or about to be 
perpetrated." Id. We held that the officers could have 
reasonably suspected that the youths committed a robbery 
and that the evidence obtained was admissible. See id. at 
864. 
 
This stop and frisk is similar. Koltunovich noticed five 
men walking in the vicinity of a reported crime scene. It 
was the middle of the night in the dead of winter and the 
streets were otherwise deserted. When Koltunovich 
approached, three men disregarded the officer's request to 
"hold up" and continued walking. Koltunovich then radioed 
a description of the men over the radio, stating that one 
man wore a black leather jacket and a bright white knit 
cap. Ross heard the broadcast and immediately saw a man 
fitting the description in the vicinity. When Ross began to 
approach, Brown ran away and attempted to elude him by 
ducking into an alleyway and a bar. These actions 
combined with the radioed information and surrounding 
circumstances are sufficient to justify an investigatory stop 
under Terry. 
 
Further, Officer Koltunovich did not make his original 
assessment of the suspects based solely on the fact that the 
men were coming from the area of the reported shooting. 
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The record indicates that the area was known as a "very 
high crime" area. The men were in close proximity to the 
crime scene a few minutes after the call of "shots fired" was 
received. It was late at night and these men were the only 
persons in the area. These factors, when considered in 
combination with the officers' experience, are also sufficient 
to warrant in investigative stop under Terry. See Rickus, 




Several specific and articulable factors contributed to the 
officers' decision that Brown could be a suspect in the West 
King Street shooting. Therefore, the evidence obtained 
during the Terry stop and frisk and subsequent police 
station search is admissible. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
district court's denial of Brown's motion to suppress. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I must respectfully dissent because the majority opinion 
approves a stop-and-frisk of Mr. Brown based on "nothing 
more substantial than inarticulate hunches" as proscribed 
by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Mr. Brown was 
merely near the wrong place at the wrong time. The 
evidence established that, at 1:30 a.m., the defendant and 
four other males were spotted walking south on Belvedere 
and turned onto Princess Street, "one block over" from the 
area of 700 West King Street, where the shootings were 
reported to have occurred.* There was no evidence to 
connect these men to the crime other than their having 
been the only ones seen by the police on the street in the 
general vicinity. The record contained no evidence as to 
when the shootings had occurred, how much time had 
elapsed between the shootings and the sighting of the five 
black males, and no evidence that the perpetrators were 
black, male, or that they were on foot. In fact, all the police 
knew was that "shots had been fired in the 700 block of 
West King Street," and "two victims of the shooting had 
been taken by a private vehicle to City Hall." For all the 
police knew at the time, the incident could have been a 
shootout with no perpetrators other than those injured. 
 
Further, Brown did not flee when two of his companions 
were questioned; rather, two stopped, and the other three, 
including Brown, kept walking. He ran only later, when a 
police car kept pursuing him. While the majority opinion 
sidesteps the issue, flight alone, under these 
circumstances, should not provide probable cause for a 
Terry stop, because flight can be the result of legitimate 
concerns on the part of the person being pursued, and, on 
its own, does not indicate that criminal activity is afoot. 
See, e.g., United States v. Young, 598 F.2d 296, 304 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979) (Robinson, J., concurring); United States v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Interestingly, a street map of York City shows the relevant portion of 
West King Street to be separated from Princess Street by several streets 
-- Light Alley, West Poplar Street, and School Place. See Mapquest, 
http://city.net/cgi/maps>. The record, however, contains only the 
officer's statement as to the geographic layout of the area. Appendix, 
p. 63. 
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Duffy, 796 F. Supp. 1252, 1258-59 (D. Minn. 1992); United 
States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
While flight with more can justify a Terry stop, here there is 
nothing more. 
 
Law enforcement officers made Brown a suspect merely 
by virtue of reporting the color of his hat and coat. The 
instant situation is clearly distinguishable from both United 
States v. Embry and United States ex rel. Richardson v. 
Rundle, on which the majority rely. In those cases there 
were facts which, when taken together with reasonable 
inferences drawn from those facts, justified an intrusion. 
Here, not only are there no facts that connect Brown with 
criminal activity, but, moreover, there are no inferences 
which can reasonably be drawn from facts of record which 
could do so. As Judge Seitz cautioned in his dissent from 
the majority opinion in United States v. Embry: 
 
       Terry and its progeny do not license the police to stop 
       individuals in public places on a bare suspicion or an 
       intuition that they may be criminals, and it certainly 
       does not permit random stops in an effort to turn 
       something up. In every case, "the police officer must be 
       able to point to specific and articulable facts which, 
       taken together with reasonable inferences from those 
       facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." 
 
546 F.2d 552, 558-59, citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
 
Here, there are no such facts. We take a giant step 
backward in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in 
giving our stamp of approval to the police conduct in this 
case. 
 
I would reverse. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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